The Problem of Freedom
The following exploration of the problem of Freedom has been written as a limited introduction. For further information consult the resource list at the end.
Terminology
Freedom: in a negative sense - the absence of constraint; in a positive sense - a condition of liberation from anything that may impede self-realization. Schopenhauer's definition: free choice of the will.
Determinism: the name given to various doctrines which appear to conflict with free will. For example, if every event has a cause that makes the event necessary, in what sense are our actions (as events) genuinely free?
Necessary: that which must be; inevitable; predestined. Schopenhauer suggested the better philosophical definition as 'that which follows from a given sufficient ground'.
Contingent: the opposite of necessary; not inevitable; liable but not certain to occur.
The Issue
It certainly feels as though we have free will, that in any circumstance we are free to do one thing or the other, but there are compelling reasons to believe that this feeling is an illusion. The question of free will isn't 'Is our will completely free?' - because that extent of free will is unlikely. The question of free will encompasses questions such as: Why does it feel as though we have free will when we probably don't? Is there no free will at all, that is, is everything completely determined, or can free will and determinism coexist? And if they can, how? By what mechanism can these seemingly contrary notions be reconciled?
Some Argy-Bargy
Arthur Schopenhauer (German philosopher 1788-1860) began his essay Freedom of the Will with an examination of what we mean by the word 'free'. He saw the concept of freedom as negative, 'as the absence of everything that impedes and obstructs', and observed that the concept had 'three different subspecies' - physical, intellectual and moral. By 'moral freedom' Schopenhauer meant 'free choice of the will'. He saw physical freedom as the ability to move without material obstacle and where those movements were voluntary. He also observed that a people can be said to be free when they are governed by laws that are determined collectively. He then moves on to the philosophical sense of the word, which he says, 'opens the way to many difficulties'.
Schopenhauer asked us to step back from what we think of as an 'act of will' and observe it once removed. For example, an act of will might be 'getting myself a drink of water'. Now imagine that I'm working, then I realise I'm thirsty, and I think 'I'll get myself a drink of water'. At that point I realise that I could get up and get a drink of water, but I might not because I'm engaged in something else and my thirst can wait. It certainly feels as if I can get a drink of water, or not get a drink of water, or make a cup of tea instead, and that therefore I have free will. It is true that my actions are dependant on my will, but on what does my will depend? It's a hard question to get your mind around. Step back from action and you get the will to act, but step back from the will to act and you get ...? What exactly? The will to will to act? Step back from that and you get ...? Someone stop me!
In Schopenhauer's view, when we say we are 'acting freely' this statement is: 'true and correct, yet with it the will is presupposed, for it assumes that the will has already made its decision, and hence nothing can be settled concerning the will itself being free. For the statement in no way speaks of the dependence or independence of the occurrence of the act of will itself, but only of the consequences of this act as soon as it occurs. ... The real meaning of (the) problem (of free will) is that the question is not one of the consequences but of the grounds of (our) willing. ... We are here inquiring about the origin of (our) acts of will themselves, and are asking whether they arise in accordance with some rule or entirely without any.'
If every event has a cause that makes the event necessary, in what sense are our actions (as events) genuinely free? We give the name 'determinism' to the doctrines, such as this, which appear to conflict with free will. Schopenhauer says 'All changes that occur in given objects in the real external world are ... subject to the law of causality, and thus always occur as necessary and inevitable, whenever and wherever they occur. To this law there can be no exception, for the rule holds a priori for all possibility of experience.' And thus the problem of freedom.
In Freedom of the Will, Schopenhauer draws an analogy between a person who says to himself 'I can do this. I can do that. It's entirely up to me' and water, which says 'I can be ice. I can be steam. It is entirely up to me. I have complete freedom'. 'Just as water can do all those things only when the determining causes enter for one or the other, so is the condition just the same for that man with respect to what he imagines he can do.'
If free will means that our will is not contingent on anything, there probably isn't such a thing as free will. But are there other ways of thinking about free will? Many people believe that free will and fate (determinism) can coexist. These people are referred to as compatibilists. A compatibilist model for the coexistence of free will and determinism can be found in the article Free Will or Fate?
Peter F. Strawson (British philosopher, 1919-2006) used the term 'optimist' instead of compatibilist, meaning that the person is 'optimistic about the compatibility of determinism and free will'. Compatibilists believe that if determinism is true, some degree of free will remains, and enough remains that we can hold people answerable for their actions. Incompatibilists, on the other hand - or 'pessimists' as Strawson refers to them - believe that if determinism is true, we have no free will, and that this undermines our ability to hold people answerable for their actions. In his work Freedom and Resentment, Strawson poses the question: would we stop feeling resentment or gratitude toward someone if we regarded their actions as determined? To which he answers 'No', saying that these reactive attitudes are part of our nature. From this he argues that determinism cannot be a threat to the concepts and practices of morality, making Strawson an optimist, that is, if determinism is true, it makes no difference to our moral beliefs or to the way we treat people in regard to their actions.
And the winner is?
The compatibilists, in my opinion, which is just as well because if the pessimists are right we wouldn't be able to justify much of our legal system. I think that the model of compatibility described in Free Will or Fate? gets us close to the truth.
Resources
Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will - Arthur Schopenhauer.
The Philosophy Gym - Stephen Law, Chapter Fifteen 'Do we ever deserve to be punished?' Available in the Bookshop.
Reading Philosophy - Guttenplan/Hornsby/Janaway.
Freedom and Resentment - Peter F. Strawson.